Automation, Creativity, and the Future of Work in Europe:

A Comparison between the Old and New Member States with a Special Focus on Hungary by Makó, Csaba & Illéssy, Miklós
  INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(2): 112–129.  
CSABA MAKÓ AND MIKLÓS ILLÉSSY 
Automation, Creativity, and the Future of Work in Europe:  
A Comparison between the Old and New Member States  
with a Special Focus on Hungary
 
 [mako.csaba@tk.mta.hu] (National University of Public Services, 
Faculty of Governance and International Studies); 
[illessy.miklos@tk.mta.hu] (Centre for Social Sciences, Eötvös Loránd 
Research Network) 
Intersections.EEJSP                     
6(2): 112–129,                                                  





Fear of job losses due to labor-saving technological change is not a 
new phenomenon, but dates back to the nineteenth-century 
Luddites in Britain. Recently, similar concerns have reawakened 
due to the rapid expansion of increasingly inexpensive and capable 
computers (digitization) and the automatization of some of the 
tasks that were formerly undertaken by workers. According to the 
empirical findings of European Working Condition Surveys 
(EWCS, 2005; 2015), every second workplace involves a form of 
‘creative work,’ which is less threatened by automation, while 
every fourth worker carries out ‘routine’ tasks that will be easily 
replaced by computers. However, important country-group-level 
differences exist: creative jobs are found at rates above the EU-27 
average in the Nordic, Continental, and Anglo-Saxon countries, 
while Mediterranean and Central and Eastern European countries 
are characterized by the highest proportion of jobs involving 
routine tasks. Among the post-socialist countries, Hungary lags 
behind the European average, and job loss trends suggest that 
concerns about the impacts of automatization on the job market for 
unskilled workers are valid. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For more than half a century, many business organizations and national policies 
have embraced Drucker’s declaration that organizations only have two basic 
functions: marketing and innovation (Mohr, 2009). There have been attempts by 
political and social scientists to probe the wider social implications of innovation 
on labor and employment policy through theoretical and empirical analyses that 
have stressed the impact of technological advancement in relation to destroying 
workplaces on the one extreme, and innovation as a panacea for all problems on 
the other. Apart from literature on national innovation systems initiated by the 
Scandinavian innovation governance model (Edquist, 2019), more balanced 
evaluations have been relatively rare.  
The significance of the topic has been further growing due to two recent 
events. The ten-year strategy of the European Union, accepted in 2010, placed 
smart, inclusive, and sustainable growth at the center of development policy 
(European Commission, 2010). Of these objectives, ‘smart’ has almost become 
synonymous with most modern technological development, ‘inclusive’ with the 
risk of widening social inequalities, while ‘sustainability’ draws attention to the 
long-term environmental and socio-economic impacts of human activity.  
A key concern that has attracted attention, particularly in the industrial, 
agricultural, and service sectors, relates to the social impacts of technological 
changes caused by automation, digitalization and robotization. Our study describes 
the complex social impacts of technological innovation through the example of 
automation by using American, European, and Hungarian quantitative analyses. 
On the basis of cluster analysis we intend to answer  three main research 
questions: i) to what extent are European labor markets susceptible to automation, 
ii) to what extent do EU Member States differ in this regard, and iii) what trends 
can be identified with respect to this phenomenon over time (i.e., between 2005 
and 2015)? Our paper reviews the history of automation and the most relevant 
literature in the field, presents our own conceptual framework in the second 
section, describes the methodology and the data sources used in the empirical 
analysis, summarizes results, and raises some research questions and challenges 
for the future.  
 
2. Literature review: between automation anxiety and 
technological optimism 
 
Pessimistic forecasts about the negative impact of technological changes on 
employment, or so-called ‘automation anxiety’ has a long history in the social 
sciences.1 John Maynard Keynes (1931) signaled that technological unemployment 
 
1 However, it is important to point out now that although the terms ‘automation’ and ‘digitalisation’ 
are used interchangeably, they slightly differ in content. In a stricter sense, automation is the 
phenomenon of manpower being replaced by machines for the same task. Digitalisation, on the other 
hand, means a process of using sensors and other digital instruments to transform processes of 
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was the new disease of economic development in the first third of the twentieth 
century. Moreover, he also drew attention to the possibility that countries lagging 
behind in development might find themselves in a more disadvantaged situation in 
the long term, while the hardships of adapting to technological changes are 
temporary. Leontief (1952) represented the more pessimistic view when he 
suggested that work would become less important in the future as machines 
increasingly replace workers, who will not necessarily be employed by newly 
emerging industries.  
While changes in labor always occur, for nearly half a century forecasts that 
technological change will result in mass unemployment have not materialized. The 
employment-related problems accompanying new forms of development and 
technological unemployment have been regarded as temporary, short-term 
hardships related to adaptation. In addition, development-related failures have also 
signaled the hidden limits to automation. For instance, in the 1980s Volkswagen 
launched a project known as Halle 54 that was called the ‘automated factory,’ 
involving Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM). However, the experiment 
failed as the number of car rejects that were produced increased enormously, and 
repairing them made the factory uneconomical. By the end of the 1980s, attempts 
to totally automate production and entirely phase out the human factor were 
abandoned. According to Hack and Pfeiffer, VW’s unsuccessful attempt at radical 
automation was the guinea pig and exemplar of a narrow-minded technological 
approach to modernization according to which every business organization is 
interpreted as technological in nature. In the authors’ opinion, this approach had 
reached its limits, just as Taylorism did in the past. The basic reason for the failure 
of both approaches is that their rationalizing strategy was based on a flawed 
understanding of human-centered work organizations (Hack, 1994; Pfeiffer, 2010; 
Kopp, Howaldt and Schultze, 2016). The overarching question that has remained 
unchanged since then is how can human labor best be valued in the context of 
innovation and social change? 
With the advent of intelligent robots, driverless cars, 3D printing, and, more 
generally, artificial intelligence (AI), we again are witnessing the resurrection of 
claims that technological development will cause unemployment, or, more broadly, 
automation anxiety (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Ford, 2015). Nevertheless, in 
contrast to the earlier views of experts, those marketing the benefits of 
digitalization stress that robots are now partners and not enemies of workers, and 
increasingly will be so in the future. Nevertheless, estimates vary about the actual 
impact technological change is having on employment. Andrea Szalavetz (2018) 
likens the competing prophecies that envisage proximate employment disaster to a 
‘numbers war.’ For instance, according to Frey and Osborne (2017), almost half of 
all employees (47 per cent) will be replaced by computers and algorithms in the 
 
production or logistics into digitally conveyable and processable forms. Artificial intelligence (AI) – 
according to the most commonly used terminology ‘is a system ability to operate in a goal-oriented 
fashion and anticipate its environment’ (Koski and Husso, 2018: 56). What they have in common is an 
attempt to capture the efficiency of digital technologies; consequently, their impact on work and 
employment is similar in many cases. 
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USA in the forthcoming one or two decades. Bowles (2014) states that 45–60 per 
cent of the jobs in Europe will be automated. Experts say that within Europe the 
majority (59 per cent) of jobs in Germany are threatened by the risk of automation 
(Brzeski and Burk, 2015). 
The most recent analyses have drawn attention to the more differentiated 
consequences of the impacts of automation and robotization on employment, 
rejecting scenarios that represent and simplify the likely radical changes. For 
example, one of the most recent studies from the internationally renowned 
consultancy firm McKinsey & Company, which involved the analysis of more than 
two thousand activities undertaken in nearly 800 jobs in the USA, found that in the 
following decade automation will result in the total disappearance of few actual 
jobs. Instead, a thorough transformation is already underway, affecting all jobs to a 
greater or smaller extent, regardless of the specific tasks undertaken at work (Chui, 
Manyika and Miremadi, 2016). The most recent analysis of the OECD 21 (Arntz, 
Gregory and Zierhan, 2016) came to very similar conclusions to those of the 
previous research: namely, that only onetenth (9 per cent) of all jobs in America 
are likely to be wiped out by the digital revolution. 
The use of various concepts, levels of analysis and analytical methodologies 
often lead to incomparable, sometimes conflicting results. The field of labor 
sciences is no different, but the following two mainstream approaches can be 
distinguished. The first involves surveying the presence of information-
communication technologies (ICT) in certain industries or jobs, and, based on 
these data estimates, developing forecasts of the future development of these 
technologies and their future impact on employment. The second approach is more 
differentiated, relying on surveys and other analytical tools to examine the effect 
of automation/digitalization on typical tasks in the workplace, from which 
aggregated estimates about impacts can be made. Our paper deals with the latter 
approach in detail. 
One of the most significant analyses in the related field was carried out by 
David H. Autor (2014), who interpreted the possible impacts of automation on the 
level of tasks at work by drawing on Mihály Polányi’s ideas, which were used as a 
theoretical framework. Polanyi examined the role of tacit knowledge by 
researching the structure of personal knowledge, and came to the conclusion that 
we know more than we can communicate in words (Polanyi, 1966). Polányi’s 
insights made a contribution by creating a bridge between two main areas of 
human knowledge: explicit knowledge that can easily be codified and transferred 
formally, and tacit (personal) knowledge that is hard or impossible to codify.  
Autor (2014), after examining the proportion of explicit and tacit knowledge 
elements necessary for undertaking work-related duties, divided jobs into three 
main categories: abstract-intensive, routine-intensive, and manual-intensive 
physical jobs. He argued that these three groups are exposed to the impacts of 
automation to different extents. ‘Human tasks that have proved most amenable to 
computerization are those that follow explicit, codifiable procedures – such as 
multiplication – where computers now vastly exceed human labour in speed, 
quality, accuracy, and cost efficiency. Tasks that have proved most vexing to 
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automate are those that demand flexibility, judgment, and common sense – skills 
that we understand only tacitly – for example, developing a hypothesis or 
organizing a closet. In these tasks, computers are often less sophisticated than 
preschool age children’ (Autor, 2014: 129). 
After distinguishing these three groups, Autor started to examine American 
employment statistics and attempted to fit the ten non-agricultural main groups of 
jobs into his typology of three. The first category includes managerial positions 
and jobs that require higher education qualifications or a secondary school 
certificate, which are associated with higher salaries in general and require a high 
level of vocational education. Autor classifies employees in sales, office work and 
administration, production, assembly, repair and other jobs that require manual 
skills into the second category. These jobs are typically white-collar jobs requiring 
a secondary education, in relation to which the proportion of women is high, and 
also some blue collar jobs occupied by men who typically have a secondary or 
lower-level education. The third group of jobs includes security, the professions of 
personal assistance, cleaning, hospitality, and other service-oriented positions. 
These are jobs that offer lower salaries and/or require a lower level of education. 
According to Autor, digitalization primarily threatens jobs in the second category, 
as these are the tasks that can be routinized most easily. 
In addition, Autor analyzed the employment trends of these three 
employment groups in the United States, beginning in 1979. Data justify his 
hypothesis that the proportion of those employed in the second category has 
historically decreased. The employment statistics span nearly four decades, and 
show on-going hollowing out of the second group (i.e. white-collar positions 
associated with a secondary education, and blue-collar jobs requiring secondary or 
a lower level of education). A similar trend can be traced in the European 
employment data as well. According to Autor, this decrease can partly by 
explained by increasing automation and digitalization. 
However, the impact of automation does not merely involve the phasing out 
of jobs; rather, it prevails in a more complex way. ‘The fact that a task cannot be 
computerized does not imply that computerization has no effect on that task. On 
the contrary: tasks that cannot be substituted by computerization are generally 
complemented by it. This point is as fundamental as it is overlooked’ (Autor, 2014: 
136). In these cases, digitalization does not have a direct impact on employment, 
but clearly influences job quality. As can be seen, the impact of automation 
prevails via a more complex mechanism that cannot be simplified merely as the 
‘anxiety and fear of technological unemployment’ that arises from time to time. 
Autor’s analysis shows that over the past four decades employment polarization 
has increased; i.e. there has been growth in the number of individuals with a 
higher level of education and high-wage jobs, and also of those with a lower level 
education in low-wage jobs, with a hollowing out in the middle, where a 
significant reduction in the number of jobs is statistically observable. 
However, not everyone agrees with the polarization argument. Fernández-
Macías, Hurley and Bisello (2016) in a study published with the support of the 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
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(Eurofound), examined the possible impact of automation on the European 
employment structure. From an analysis of the literature about employment shifts 
generated by technological development, the authors concluded that there are two 
wider-scale streams within it: skill-biased vs. routine-biased technological change. 
The former appreciates education and finds skill upgrading to be a major 
contributor to the employment tendencies of the past decades. The latter approach 
(which includes Autor’s analysis) envisages the decreasing significance of routine 
tasks, and analyses the same data within the theoretical framework of employment 
polarization, looking for proof of justification. ‘With upgrading employment shifts, 
the expected pattern is a more or less linear improvement in employment 
structure, with the greatest employment growth in high-paid (or high-skilled) jobs, 
the weakest growth in low-paid (or low-skilled) jobs, and middling growth in the 
middle. With polarisation, the main difference is that the relative positions, in 
terms of employment dynamics of the middle and bottom levels of the job 
distribution, are swapped: employment growth is weakest in the middle and 
relatively stronger at both ends of the job–wage distribution, leading to a 
“hollowed middle”’ (Fernández-Macías, Hurley and Bisello, 2016: 11). 
This polarization effect has prevailed in European small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME): ‘The crisis period of 2008–2010 was characterized by significant 
job loss in Europe […]. The overall trend towards job polarization could also be 
observed for SMEs, with a lower level of job loss among the lowest-paid and 
highest-paid jobs compared with the medium wage categories’ (Mandle et. al, 2016: 
19). A similar trend may be noted in the most recent IMF review, which concludes 
that it is the service sector (financial services, public administration, healthcare, 
and education) that is worst affected by polarization. There are signs that more 
detailed research is required to confirm that polarization is occurring in the sectors 
most exposed to technological change (International Monetary Fund, 2017). 
In order to obtain a more accurate picture about European employment 
shifts after the financial and economic crisis (2008) than the general analyses that 
are available, Fernández-Macías, Hurley, and Bisello (2016) combined the approach 
of examining employment groups with industrial analyses so that their basic unit 
of observation was jobs within specific industries. These were then classified into 
quintiles on the basis of average salaries so that the employment level could be 
examined before, during, and after the crisis. Due to the constraints of the study, 
neither the methodology nor the results can be presented in detail here, but the 
following contains a summary of the three most important findings.  
First, European employment trends have always been characterized by the 
simultaneous presence of skill upgrading and polarization, although the extent of 
these has changed dynamically throughout the years. Before the global financial 
crisis and economic downturn that began in 2008, upgrading skills dominated, 
while polarization also took place, although minimally. In the aftermath of the 
crisis, polarization obviously increased while employment also climbed in relation 
to the jobs in the upper quintile, so upgrading also prevailed. The more recent 
phenomenon (lasting from the second quarter of 2013 to the second quarter of 
2015) was a well-balanced increase in employment with a minimal shift to higher 
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skilled jobs. There was no sign of a lessening of demand for skills on an aggregate 
European level, but the increase in the level of the former was less obvious than in 
the years before the crisis (Fernández-Macías, Hurley and Bisello, 2016). While the 
current economic downturn caused by the response to COVID-19 appears to be 
hitting Western Europe and the USA particularly hard, even as unemployment 
levels remain relatively low in Eastern European countries, it remains to be seen 
whether the trend will increase polarization.  
Second, although the most recent trends related to the employment shift are 
less compatible with skill upgrading than before the crisis, skill downgrading 
obviously occurred only in two countries. ‘Over the four-year period 2011–2015, 
Hungary and Italy both experienced an obvious downgrading pattern of 
employment shift. In each of these countries, employment growth was strongest in 
the lowest-paid jobs and weaker in higher-paid jobs […]. At aggregate EU level 
(sic) over 2011–2015, there was upgrading with some polarization – relatively 
faster growth in the bottom than in the middle. However, this involved a more 
even spread of job gains across the wage distribution, as employment growth 
accelerated from mid-2013 onwards’ (Fernández-Macías, Hurley and Bisello, 2016: 
13). 
Third, while the greatest growth was produced by the service sector, 
employment also increased in some areas of the manufacturing industry, such as 
in food processing and car manufacturing. Moreover, in these sub-industries the 
greatest growth was observed in the highest paid jobs. 
 
3. Automation and creativity: A conceptual framework 
 
To describe labor markets in the Member States of the European Union from the 
perspective of the possible impact of current and future waves of automation and 
digitalization, we draw upon the theoretical basis elaborated by Frey and Osborne 
(2017), who distinguished three major job characteristics – perception and 
manipulation, creative intelligence, and social intelligence – that may inhibit the 
substitution of human labour by computers. The authors conclude that jobs 
requiring the mobilization of any of these labour inputs are less likely to be 
automated. Here, we narrow our focus to the creative element of job requirements 
for two reasons. First, we wanted to keep our model as simple as possible, and 
second, the creative dimension is relatively easy to measure compared to the 
perception/manipulation and social intelligence dimensions, which are more 
difficult to capture using survey questions. We assume that countries where the 
share of creative jobs is high will be less impacted by automation and digitization 
in terms of job losses, and that countries where creative jobs are less dominant are 
more susceptible to the negative effects – in terms of job losses – of automation. 
In order to estimate the potential impact of automation in the European 
Union, we use Lundvall and Lorenz’s work (Lundvall and Lorenz, 2010) as a 
starting point. Inspired by Richard Florida’s seminal work on the creative class 
(Florida, 2002), the authors analyzed the fourth wave of European Working 
Condition Survey (EWCS) data from 2005 to examine the emergence of the 
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European creative class. Their conceptual framework, however, permits us to 
extend their analysis to make a preliminary forecast about the susceptibility of 
European jobs to automation by combining the data analysis that is available at the 
job-task level with the analytical conception of Autor about the cognitive aspects 
of jobs. Instead of predicting the probability of automation on an occupational 
basis, analysis of the EWCS database makes it possible to investigate directly the 
likelihood at the job level, which – in our opinion – provides a better estimate of 
the potential employment impacts of automation and digitalization. 
We assume that creative jobs involve highly abstract elements involving 
more tacit knowledge and complex problem solving that is harder to automate. We 
also assume that creativity at work is associated with some level of employee 
autonomy, thus the higher the level of autonomy an employee enjoys at work, the 
less the probability that their job will be automated. Therefore, following the 
model of Lorenz and Lundvall, we used two types of variables in our analysis to 
measure the probability of automation, one capturing the cognitive aspects of jobs, 
and the other measuring employee autonomy at work. 
 




Source: Authors’ compilation 
 
Because these data describe job requirements, our unit of analysis is jobs, not 
employees, which is an important consideration when interpreting our results. It is 
also important to note that the assumptions we make about the probability of 
automation are valid only under the conditions of the current technological 
paradigm. As technology develops over time, new opportunities and development 
paths will open up; consequently, the real effects of digitalization may vary in 
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ways that cannot be clearly projected now. What is more, the employment impacts 
of technological development are not determined solely by technology itself, but 
are also shaped by societal change that is engineered or driven by stakeholders 
(governments, trade-unions, civic organizations, employers’ associations, the 
scientific community) and externalities (such as a global pandemic and resulting 
economic downturn). In other words, while many of the studies about automation 
that have recently been published are informed to varying degrees by 
technological determinism and confident predictions about the future, we do not 
share these approaches and strongly believe in societal agency, and that the future 
is ultimately unknown. However, we share the following view of Freeman that 
‘technology in itself is neither good nor bad. It is the use which human beings 
make of any technology which determines both the nature and the extent of 
benefits’ (quoted in Soete, 2018: 29). 
 
4. Methodology and data sources 
 
Data from several European Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS) represent a 
unique opportunity to analyze empirically task-based changes over a longer time 
(i.e. taking a longitudinal perspective). The survey is based on interviews with 
almost forty thousand European employees that are carried out every five years 
(Eurofound, 2015). Part of the survey instrument focuses on identifying the 
cognitive (learning) characteristics of work, as well as the level of autonomy of 
employees. These two dimensions of work are especially important for identifying 
the level of exposure to automation: as Autor (2014) suggested, until machines 
learn to study, only activities whose rules can relatively easily be programmed can 
be automated, such as those based on transparent, explicit routines that do not 
require human interaction in ad hoc situations.   
Since Lundvall and Lorenz published their above-mentioned paper in 2010, 
the database of the 2015 survey was also made available, allowing us to identify 
longitudinal trends between 2005 and 2015. We also extended the scope of analysis 
by including the New Member States of the post-socialist countries, which is 
another novel feature. This paper focuses on salaried employees working in 
organizations with at least 10 employees in non-agricultural sectors as industry 
and service, excluding public administration and social security; education; health 
and social work; household activities; as well as agriculture and fishing. In 
addition, the study excludes several non-market occupational categories such as 
armed forces occupations; skilled and elementary agricultural, forestry and fishery 
occupations. To be simple and brief, data from Malta and Cyprus are not listed 
separately in the tables but as part of the European average. Furthermore, Croatia 
was also excluded from the sample as it joined the European Union only in 2013. 
On the basis of Lorenz and Lundvall (2010), the following six variables were 
used to identify the cognitive dimensions of work tasks and the level of employee 
autonomy: i) the importance of problem-solving ability at work, ii) the opportunity 
for studying new things, iii) the complexity of work tasks, iv) the possibility of 
using ideas at work, v) the level of autonomy in selecting working methods, and 
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vi) the level of autonomy in choosing the order of work tasks. First, we employed 
multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), followed by Ward’s method of 
hierarchical cluster analysis on the basis of the factor scores.2  
The cluster analysis distinguished three larger groups of jobs. In creative 
jobs, employees have to make use of their cognitive abilities at work to a large 
extent, and enjoy a large degree of autonomy. Jobs organized on Taylorean 
principles represent the other end of the scale, and involve the least use of 
cognitive abilities and autonomy. Between these two groups, constrained problem 
solvers can be identified whose jobs are characterized by relatively strong 
expectancies about cognitive learning, and an extremely low level of autonomy. 
We assume on the basis of the above that Taylorean jobs will be most affected by 
automation, while the jobs of creative workers and, to a slighter extent, 
constrained problem solvers, will be less dramatically affected by the processes of 
automation. 
 
5. Research results 
 
Analysis of the changes in the EU-27 average shows that within the ten years of 
the survey, few changes were experienced in terms of single jobs. Almost one-
quarter of all the jobs of European employees may be defined as involving 
constrained problem solving,3 and half of all employees had creative jobs. 
However, as can be seen from Table 1, the stable European average masks 
significant differences and dynamics between the country groups. Not 
surprisingly, most creative jobs can proportionally be found in Scandinavian 
countries. Almost three-quarters of jobs in that region significantly rely on the 
cognitive abilities of employees, which ensure a high level of autonomy. Of the 
three Nordic countries examined during the ten years, the proportion of the former 
jobs also increased in Denmark and Finland, while Sweden, which originally had 
the highest proportion, experienced a decrease. In parallel, the proportion of 
Taylorean jobs is the lowest in Europe, and significantly decreased or levelled off 
in Sweden between 2005 and 2015. 
The Continental country group shows a much more heterogeneous picture. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Germany, with a downward trend, stands out from this 
cluster as the number of creative jobs does not reach 50 per cent, while the share of 
Taylorean ones reaches nearly 30 per cent. The proportion of the latter is the 
lowest in Luxembourg, almost at the level of the Scandinavian countries, which 
can be explained by the former’s well-developed financial sector. A significant 
difference, in comparison with the Nordic countries, is that the proportion of 
constrained problem-solving jobs in Germany is much larger.  
The case of the Netherlands is similar to that of Germany, with increasing 
proportions of Taylorean jobs. This is noteworthy, as in 2005 the Netherlands was 
 
2 For further methodological details, see Makó et al. (2019) and Lorenz and Lundvall (2010). 
3 It is important to stress that it is not employees but jobs that are characterised as creative or 
Taylorean. An underskilled employee may also have a creative job, and many highly qualified 
professionals have less creative jobs.  
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more similar to the Scandinavian county group than the Continental one. 
However, the years since the 2008-2009 economic crisis have brought about radical 
change, but in a negative direction.4 In contrast, the proportion of creative jobs in 
Austria has significantly increased. 
 
Table 1: Types of Workplaces: Country Group Comparison –  




CW CPS TW CW CPS TW 
Nordic countries 
Denmark 74 13 13 77 14 9 
Finland 67 20 13 73 18 9 
Sweden 80 10 10 74 15 11 
Continental countries 
Austria 51 29 20 57 25 19 
Belgium 56 20 23 59 19 21 
France 59 19 21 62 24 14 
Netherlands 72 16 13 63 16 21 
Luxemburg 63 18 19 65 24 11 
Germany 51 25 24 49 23 29 
Mediterranean countries 
Greece 40 32 28 28 32 40 
Italy 40 28 33 45 16 38 
Portugal 42 24 34 41 28 31 
 
4 To decide what role the crisis, technical changes gaining ground, or a third factor, played in these 
changes is beyond the scope of the study. Our paper makes reference to the crisis as it is obvious that 
such shocks do have an impact on job quality, especially the creative dimension of work tasks, and 
the extent of employees’ autonomy.  
AUTOMATION, CREATIVITY, AND THE FUTURE OF WORK IN EUROPE 123 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 6(2): 112–129.  
 
2005 2015 
CW CPS TW CW CPS TW 
Spain 37 28 35 47 28 25 
Anglo-Saxon countries 
Ireland 58 19 22 55 21 24 
United Kingdom 50 20 30 59 21 20 
EU-27 50 24 26 52 24 24 
Source: Authors’ calculation from the fourth (2005) and the sixth (2015) waves of 
the European Working Conditions Survey. Legend: CW= Creative Workers; CPS= 
Constrained problem-solvers; TW= Taylorized Workers. 
 
The period of the crisis also accelerated convergent processes in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries within the cluster. In 2005, 58 per cent of the jobs in Ireland were 
creative, which proportion had decreased to 55 per cent by 2015. In contrast, 
during the same period in the United Kingdom this share increased from 50 per 
cent to 59 per cent. Interestingly, this significant growth exclusively impacted 
Taylorean jobs, while the proportion of constrained problem solvers did not 
change. Numerically, this means that in the United Kingdom the share of least 
creative jobs decreased from 30 per cent to 20 per cent within 10 years.  
Not surprisingly, within the EU-15 countries the proportion of creative jobs 
is smallest in the Mediterranean countries. It is more interesting however, that 
most of the latter countries were able to catch up in this regard with the EU-27 
average during the crisis. Spain takes the lead, where the proportion of creative 
work increased from 37 per cent to 47 per cent, but in Italy the share also grew 
from 40 per cent to 45 per cent. In Portugal, the proportion did not change. Only in 
Greece did it dramatically decline, from 40 per cent to 28 per cent.5 In parallel, the 
proportion of Taylorean jobs was strikingly high, not only in comparison with the 
old Member States but also most post-socialist countries The two extremes are 
represented by Spain and Greece, respectively. The proportion of least creative 
jobs decreased by 10 percent in the former, and increased by 12 percent in the 
latter. Another fact worth highlighting is that in Italy not only did the proportion 
of the most innovative jobs increase, but the least innovative ones did as well 
during the same time period (between 2005 and 2015). 
The Post-Socialist country group also shows a varied picture (Table 2). 
Estonia stands out from the Baltic North-Eastern European counties, as the high 
proportion of creative jobs and the general distribution of job types are similar to 
 
5 The latter one also signals that in addition to the technological changes the crisis also played a great 
role in forming clusters at work. 
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those of the more developed countries of the Continental cluster. Lithuania is 
positioned in the middle, as less than half of all jobs were creative, and the rest 
were evenly distributed among the other two types of jobs. The case of Latvia is 
unique since it is one of the least developed countries in the EU, although it was 
one of the leaders in terms of the number of creative jobs in the region in 2005. 
While 2010 data are not included in the table, it is worth remarking that the 
country strengthened its position at that time, and the drastic decrease occurred 
within the last five years. The Visegrad countries and Slovenia were categorized as 
Central European countries, although the latter significantly differs from the 
others regarding innovative jobs. The 55 per cent of creative jobs is similar to the 
proportion in Anglo-Saxon countries, and makes Slovenia stand out in this country 
group, similarly to Estonia in the North Eastern country cluster. What is striking 
in connection with the countries of the Visegrad region is that, in all four member 
countries, the share of creative jobs decreased after the 2008/2009 crisis. This 
decrease was strongest in Hungary, which went from having 44 per cent to 37 per 
cent of the latter jobs. Hungary is also the only one of the five countries where the 
proportion of least innovative, Taylorean jobs exceeds that of the share of 
constrained problem solver jobs, whose autonomy is minimal but for which the 
learning capability of employees is crucial. The proportion of these jobs increased 
by six percent within ten years. The situation in Poland is similar. Creative jobs 
lost ground due to an increase in Taylorean jobs. The weaker position of the 
Visegrad countries resulted in the fact that the share of innovative jobs in two 
South-Eastern European Member States (Romania and Bulgaria) further eroded. This 
occurred in parallel with stasis in the proportion of creative jobs, although the 
former decrease was much smaller than in Hungary. 
 
Table 2: Types of Workplaces: Country Group Comparison –  




CW CPS TW CW CPS TW 
North Eastern Europe 
Estonia 57 25 19 62 21 18 
Latvia 52 19 29 35 17 48 
Lithuania 39 30 31 45 28 27 
Central Eastern Europe 
Czech Republic 43 30 27 38 32 30 
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2005 2015 
CW CPS TW CW CPS TW 
Poland 46 32 22 41 30 29 
Hungary 44 29 27 37 30 33 
Slovakia 37 32 31 35 35 31 
Slovenia 52 24 24 55 26 19 
South Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria 40 30 29 38 34 28 
Romania 37 39 24 35 37 28 
EU-27 50 24 26 52 24 24 
Source: Authors’ calculation from the fourth (2005) and the sixth (2015) waves of 
European Working Conditions Survey. Legend: CW= Creative Workers; CPS= 
Constrained problem-solvers; TW= Taylorized Workers.  
 
6. Summary and challenges for future research  
 
The ongoing increase in info-communication technologies in production and 
services draws attention to the importance of examining the social – and 
particularly work-related – impacts of technological changes. During the earlier 
years of ‘automation anxiety’ that were generated by automation, digitalization, 
and robotization, menacing forecasts projected the disappearance of many jobs. 
The second wave of studies, more empirically focused, revealed a more complex 
picture and produced more differentiated findings. In parallel, researchers started 
to concentrate on the content of work tasks, instead of job groups, making 
estimations of how many employees are endangered by automation. This has also 
involved examining jobs for which automation does not substitute but rather 
complements human work, thereby making more differentiated analysis possible. 
In our analysis we first applied the analytical framework of Frey and 
Osborne (2017), which classifies three main elements of job content that may 
inhibit attempts at automation: perception and manipulation, creative intelligence, 
and social intelligence. Using the databases of different waves of the European 
Working Conditions Survey allowed us to measure the risk of automation in line 
with the creative intelligence dimension of European jobs. We then used the model 
of Lundvall and Lorenz (2010) to identify three clusters of jobs that are susceptible 
to automation to different degrees, with creative jobs that are characterized by a 
high level of employee autonomy and creative skill requirements being at the 
lowest risk of automation. In contrast, Taylorean jobs can be characterized by low 
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level of employee autonomy and less room for creativity, meaning that these jobs 
are more likely to be automated. The third cluster of jobs, constrained problem 
solvers, are located in between the previous two cluster and can be characterized 
by a high level of creativity and low level of autonomy. Interpreting more deeply 
the susceptibility of these jobs to automation poses a challenge, particularly in 
view of recent social and economic developments, but we estimate that these kinds 
of jobs are less likely to be automated than Taylorean ones. 
The results of the 2005 and 2015 EWCS database were analyzed, and led to 
the following most important findings: 
1) Although the aggregated job cluster patterns of the EU-27 average have 
hardly changed in the examined ten-year period (2005–2015), significant 
differences exist between countries and important shifts took place.  
2) In European countries, the proportion of creative jobs is the greatest and 
that of Taylorean jobs the smallest in the Scandinavian countries, followed by 
the members of the Continental and Anglo-Saxon country groups. With regard 
to the former metrics, the situation in Mediterranean and the East-Central 
European post-socialist countries is below the average of their European peers, 
with the former somewhat more favorably positioned. 
3) From 2005 to 2015 strong convergence can be detected within the 
Scandinavian, Continental, and Anglo-Saxon country groups, while differences 
between the groups remained or even slightly increased. In contrast, significant 
divergence can be observed within the Mediterranean and the Post-Socialist 
country groups.  
4) Estonia and Slovenia stand out from the post-socialist countries, as the 
share of creative jobs is similar to that of the Continental and Anglo-Saxon 
country groups. In contrast, the share of creative jobs significantly decreased in 
the Visegrad countries, occasionally approaching the level of Romania and 
Bulgaria, which countries are considered to be the least developed in the region.   
 
Due to our particular interest in forecasting the employment risks of automation in 
Hungary, it is worth stressing that negative trends prevail in Hungary. While 2010 
data are not included in our tables, it can clearly be seen from the results that the 
situation had become unfavorable within that timeframe. In 2010, the share of 
creative jobs was 48 per cent, of Taylorean ones 23 per cent, and within five years 
the proportion of the former had dropped to 37 per cent, and that of the latter 
increased to 33 per cent. All these processes are a cause for concern as 
technological development may result in the high exposure to automation of 
Taylorean jobs.  
Hungary has based its economic competitiveness on a cheap but skilled 
labor force, and its geographical proximity to the center of Europe. This strategy 
was successful until the middle of the 2000s. With some significant exceptions, 
such as automotive, high-tech service, and software companies, Hungarian 
enterprises have been unable to attract higher value-added activities that could 
open the way to more knowledge-based economic development. There are signs 
that the segmented nature of the Hungarian economy has increased in past 
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decades, as internationally renowned companies that produce and provide services 
to international markets exist and operate side by side with newly created small- 
and medium-sized enterprises that operate on the Hungarian market, and growing 
players in the state-owned or partly state-owned sectors (Makó and Illéssy, 2016). 
Weak cooperation and networking between these three segments creates a barrier 
to exploiting the economic opportunities of the country. Automation, digitization, 
AI, and the related changes in working organizations are the tools for renewing 
the competitiveness strategy of Hungary. For example, in the United Kingdom, one 
of the explicit objectives of the strategy that has been defined to improve Industry 
4.0 is to rebuild the industrial basis of the economy and relocate (resource) 
processing industry activities back to the island from low-labour-cost countries 
(Made Smarter, 2017: 8). If these scenarios play out, such changes may occur that 
foster the reorganization of global value chains and shake up Hungary’s position 
in this field. Although the cheaper and more disciplined labour force – and 
extremely developed supplier network – in South East Asia posed less of a threat 
to Hungarian jobs than expected, German AI-related ambitions and the shift 
towards the use of electric cars represent a much more realistic danger to jobs that 
is predominantly associated with routine tasks in the production and service 
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